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This paper investigates the production of research in business and economics. A 
scholar's income is positively related to the quantity and quality of research. In turn, the 
quality of a paper depends on the scholar's human capital and the external production of 
research. The individual scholar is subject to a trade-off between writing more papers or 
reading in order to upgrade her skills. In the Nash symmetric equilibrium, the quantity 
and quality of published papers are jointly determined. Under reasonable assumptions 
about the research production process, in equilibrium researchers write too many papers 
of a too low quality, as compared to the cooperative outcome. Policy implications can 
be inferred from the model. 
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A TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVE
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Abstract
This paper investigates the production of research in business and economics. A scholar’s reward is
positively related to the quantity and quality of research. In turn, the quality of a paper depends
on the scholar’s ability to internalize new ideas and the overall quality of external research. The
individual scholar is subject to a trade-oﬀ between writing more papers or reading in order to take
in new ideas. In the Nash symmetric equilibrium, the quantity and quality of published papers
are jointly determined. Under reasonable assumptions about the research production process, in
equilibrium researchers write too many papers of too low a quality compared to the cooperative
outcome. The model sheds some light on the eﬀectiveness of various research policies currently under
review by European policymakers.
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The Lisbon Summit of 2000 set the target for Europe to become by 2010 the most competitive
knowledge-based economic area in the world. While many observers were stunned by the
seemingly overoptimistic rhetoric of the message, it is true that in the last few years many
EU governments decided to reform their research management systems in order to enhance
the region’s research capabilities. In particular, the idea according to which research should
build on a stronger connection between rewards and performance is gaining momentum.
All ﬁelds of research are concerned by this transformation, including research in business
administration and economics. In this ﬁeld, several governments are seriously considering to
follow the UK example and allocate resources to universities and research centers according
to a type of public evaluation process (Loft et al. 2002; Chan et al. 2006; Groot and
García-Valderrama, 2006).1
In general, research evaluation builds on two main approaches: peer review and biblio-
metric measures. The peer review method is based on experts’ subjective assessment of the
quality of the research output. The bibliometric approach focuses on objective measures,
such as publication or citation counts. Yet, there is little doubt that peer committees also
take into account some variant of publication count when they come to evaluate the research
performance of a given scholar or institution (Oswald, 2007; Mingers and Harzing, 2006;
Groot and García-Valderrama, 2006). Privately owned European business schools are not
subject to the same administrative constraints. But in a world where a school’s publication
record is revealed every year by various rankings compiled by the business-oriented news-
1 The UK national evaluation system referred to as the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE) has been
carried out since 1986.
1papers, these institutions must also pay signiﬁcant attention to the publication criterion.
Europe is thus embracing the trend set-up many years ago by American universities, by im-
plementing resource allocation mechanisms that bring into full light the "publish or perish"
dictum.2
The paper addresses the research management issue, taking into consideration some of
the policies that are currently being reviewed by European policymakers in a context where
the volume of published research is edging up sharply (Goel and Faria, 2006). Our analysis
builds on a basic fact of life: a researcher has a limited amount of working time that he
can split between writing original papers and reading the others’ papers. While the scholar
who writes many papers may expect to publish more, and thus get a bigger reward, he
would also spend less time on reading and getting informed about the latest advances in his
ﬁeld of research which, in turn, may adversely aﬀect the quality of his own research.3 A
similar trade-oﬀ has been emphasized by Lucas (1988): in his endogenous growth model, the
individual must choose to allocate his time between producing goods and investing in skill
acquisition (education), where skill accumulation improves productivity in the future.
Going from the individual to the collective organization of research, the model brings into
the picture two spill-in eﬀects speciﬁc to the research production process: the duplication
(or multiple innovation) eﬀect and the congestion eﬀect. The former eﬀect underlines the
idea according to which, whatever the ﬁeld of research, there will always be competing teams
2 See, on the role of publications in the US context, Gomez-Meija and Balkin (1992), Swanson (2004),
Coupé (2004), Hilmer and Hilmer (2005).
3 The trade-oﬀ between the number of papers and their quality has been emphasized by Faria (2003). Bence
and Oppenheim (2003) point out that when the administration imposes quantitative publication targets, some
scholars may choose to achieve the target by undercutting the quality of their work; for instance, they recycle
previous work for diﬀerent journals, divide a single piece of research into several articles, or rush into print
with mediocre works.
2trying to solve the same problem. The more researchers study the same problem, the bigger
the chances that some of them will reach the same conclusion. As pointed out by Merton
(1957, 1961), independent multiple discoveries seem to be the dominant pattern in science.
To take a well known example from economics, both Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps
could claim to be the father of the concept of natural unemployment. The direct consequence
of the duplication eﬀect is that research appears to be a typical diminishing return process
(Jones, 1995): ceteris paribus, doubling the number of researchers working in a given ﬁeld
generates probably more original ideas but less than twice as many.
The congestion eﬀect, emphasized by Stigler et al. (1995), occurs when the proliferation
of papers adversely aﬀects the scholar’s ability to eﬃciently internalize new ideas, i.e. to
recognize an original idea as such, to understand it and to relate it to his own work. Sub-
ject to a wider ﬂow of new papers, not only must the scholar reduce the reading time per
paper, but it also becomes harder for him to identify the relevant studies.4 In practice,
researchers may set up defense strategies in order to contain this congestion eﬀect, but prob-
ably no defense strategy is fully eﬀective. For instance, researchers may increase the degree
of specialization, but we should keep in mind that excessive specialization adversely aﬀects
productivity by favouring omission of valuable concepts and methods invented out of their
main ﬁeld of expertise. Or they may resort to author or journal reputation as a proxy for the
paper’s originality (Merton 1968). This strategy comes with its own shortcomings, given that
many great ideas were unveiled by less famous researchers (they eventually become famous
4 Modern information technologies such as search engines coupled with large bibliographic databases would
mitigate the congestion eﬀect.
3afterwards) or were published in second-tier journals (Oswald 2007).5
In the model, a scholar’s reward is related to both the quantity and the quality of his
published papers. Research quality is related to the originality and the explicative power of
the ideas (Ellison, 2002). Each scholar’s ability to produce high quality research depends
on his own ability to internalize new ideas, and the overall scientiﬁc advance of the ﬁeld as
proxied by the total number of published papers and their average quality. The researcher
is therefore subject to a diﬃcult dilemma: the more time he spends on writing, the less time
he can spend on reading papers and taking in new ideas, which is an essential input for the
quality of his own research. Hence, the optimal amount of time dedicated to writing must
strike a balance between the contribution of research quantity and quality, to the scholar’s
net payoﬀ. Furthermore, each scholar chooses the time spent on writing, taking as given the
decisions of his fellows. In the Nash symmetric equilibrium the volume and the quality of
published papers are jointly determined. As is often the case, the non-cooperative equilibrium
is not socially eﬃcient: if scholars were able to coordinate their actions, they would chose to
write less, read more and produce better quality papers.
In a second step, the model allows us to study the consequences of various policy re-
forms by means of small variations in the main parameters (which can be broadly inter-
preted as wages, research facilities, and the number of researchers). For instance, in order
to become signiﬁcant in the publication race, many European business schools have decided
to strengthen the relationship between scholars’ overall compensation and the quantity and
5 According to Azar (2005) or Besancenot and Vranceanu (2007) editors’ ability to screen the good papers
declines when they have to process a larger volume of papers. They may also set up defence strategies, for
instance by increasing on purpose the turn-over time or requiring a submission fee such as to push authors
to self-select (Azar, 2005; 2006).
4quality of their publications. Promotions, tenure, wage increases, special publication bonuses
and teaching waivers are now contingent upon adds-ons to the publication list. According to
elementary reasoning, backed by researchers themselves, more powerful incentives for publi-
cation can only improve the quantity and quality of research. This paper challenges to some
extent this conventional wisdom, with all the caveats required when making policy inference
from simple theoretical models. The basic rationale is straightforward: while for one isolated
researcher it is worth writing more when the publication bonus goes up, as all scholars fol-
low the same strategy, the total number of available papers increases, and the time a given
researcher can spend to read one paper declines. As a consequence, the quality of research
is depreciating. Other policies can be analyzed in the same way.
The relationship between incentives for publication and the quality of research has been
studied by Faria (2005), within the framework of a diﬀerential game between authors and
editors, and by Faria and Monteiro (2005) as a diﬀerential game between scholars and the
head of research (the department). In these papers, appropriate incentives for publication
(for instance, as a criteria for tenure) are shown to have a globally positive impact on the
quality of academic research, justiﬁed by journal reputation building in the former paper, or
by research habit formation in the latter. Goel and Faria (2006) analyze the consequences of
an increase in the number of journal titles, as a natural response of the academic profession
to the increase in the volume of submitted papers. They argue that greater competition
among academic journals can foster research quality. Our paper reaches more pessimistic
conclusions, since it emphasizes the negative spill-over eﬀects, congestion and duplication,
speciﬁc to the research production process. It goes beyond say that our conclusions would
5be challenged if positive eﬀects were more extensively called for.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the main assumptions.
Section 3 presents the Nash equilibrium solution and comments on the welfare implications.
Policy reforms are analyzed in section 4. The last section presents our conclusions.
2 Main assumptions
The world of academics is made up of n +1identical researchers. The total working time
over the relevant period, for instance, the academic year, is normalized to 1. The scholar
can allocate this time either to read papers, i.e. take in the latest advances in academics
and enhance his skills, or to write papers, i.e. bring his own contribution to the academic
literature.
Let us denote by q the time spent on writing papers; then (1 − q) i st h et i m ed e d i c a t e d
to reading papers (with q ∈ [0,1]). We also assume that, during a period of length q, the
researcher is able to write q papers (i.e. he needs one time unit to write one paper).
The total amount of papers published by the other n researchers is denoted by qM. For
the time being, we assume that a scholar can specialize, i.e., limit the number of screened
papers, in order to focus on a sub-ﬁeld of utmost importance to him. Denoting by α ≤ 1 the
proportion of papers he decides to read within a total of qM available papers, the number of
eﬀectively screened papers is αqM.
The quality Q of the papers written by an individual researcher depends on many factors,
related to both the researcher’s individual ability to take in new concepts, and the overall
scientiﬁc development of the ﬁeld. The scholar’s ability to internalize new concepts depends
on the total number of paper he reads (αqM) and the average time he devotes to reading any of
6these papers, denoted by τ,w h e r eτ =( 1 −q)/αqM. Indeed, one should have a better research
performance when he reads more papers, because he can ground his own assumptions and
intuitions in a broader stream of facts and concepts unveiled by his pairs. By emphasizing the
average reading time per paper, τ, we implicitly bring into the picture the congestion eﬀect:
when the number of papers goes up, at constant total reading time, the average reading
time goes down, and the scholar is less able to grasp the worthy insights from a given paper.
Finally, the overall scientiﬁc development of the ﬁeld may be related to the average quality of
the papers he reads, which will be denoted by ¯ QM. All other variables having an impact on
research quality, such as a better access to databases and research networks, better equipment
and computing power, better travel and communication facilities, are captured by a catch-all
variable, denoted by K.
In a very general form, we can write the quality of a researcher’s output as a function:
Q = Q(K,αqM, ¯ QM,τ), (1)
where, according to our assumptions, ∂Q(,,)/∂(αqM) > 0,∂Q (,,)/∂ ¯ QM > 0,∂Q (,,)/∂τ > 0
and, ∂Q(,,)/∂K > 0.
In order to get analytical insights, we need a more speciﬁc function. A convenient and
relatively ﬂexible form is the constant elasticity function, which was extensively utilized in
the endogenous growth literature (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990; Jones, 1995):
Q = K (αqM)






The positive parameters λ, θ and ν represent the (constant) elasticities of research quality
with respect to qM, ¯ QM, and τ respectively. K is a multiplicative factor, similarly to total
factor productivity in traditional growth models.
7Further introspection of standard research production processes may bring about addi-
tional information about the admissible range of these elasticities. Parameter λ is probably
lower than one, λ ∈ [0,1[. This is consistent with the logic of multiples in science (Merton
1957, 1961; Stephan, 1996) where, when doubling the number of papers, the number of orig-
inal ideas increases, but less than twice, due to the fact that similar results may be worked
out independently by several researchers.6
Parameter θ is the elasticity of individual quality with respect to the average quality of the
papers in the ﬁeld. The higher this average quality, the better the quality of the individual’s
research who can beneﬁt of the better methods developed by his colleagues. Building on a
logic of marginal decreasing returns to quality, it can be assumed that θ ∈ [0,1[. Notice that
our main results would also hold in the special case where overall quality has no impact on
individual quality (θ =0 ) .
The contribution to research quality of the researcher’s average reading time per paper
is captured by the elasticity ν. We argue that in the general case λ<ν .Stigler et al.
(1995) emphasize that when the number of papers in a given ﬁeld goes up too fast, scholars
tend to oﬀset the congestion eﬀect by specializing. For instance, when too many papers
in industrial organization come out, scholars, who can no longer follow the literature, will
focus on a sub-ﬁeld, let say contract theory or monopoly pricing. An EU Policy Paper
(European Commission, 2006) reports on the tendency for scholars in social sciences to
specialize, and documents on the emergence of new ﬁeld journals and specialized associations.
But specialization (dα < 0) is good for the scholar only if it helps him improve the quality
6 In an extreme case, if the number of papers is extremely high, there is little room left for original ideas,
ap h e n o m e n o nr e f e r r e dt oa s" ﬁshing out". This PhD student’s nightmare would imply λ<0.
8of his work (dQ > 0). Writing the quality function (2) in the alternative form:
Q = K(α)λ−ν(qM)λ−ν( ¯ QM)θ (1 − q)
ν , (3)
we notice that ∂Q/∂α < 0 ⇔ λ<ν . Hence, when specialization is the general pattern of
research in business and economics, we get that λ<ν . 7
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide an analysis of the evolving specializa-
tion norm. Hence, we assume that α is exogenously given and, to simplify formulas, it is
normalized to one. Then, the quality function can be written in the stylized form:
Q(K,qM, ¯ QM,q)=K (qM)
λ−ν ( ¯ QM)θ (1 − q)
ν . (4)
The scholar’s net payoﬀ must bring together the costs and beneﬁts connected to his
research activity. According to Merton (1957) (see also Stephan 1996), beneﬁts should in-
corporate both the monetary reward and the social recognition of its work. Converted into
monetary units, the reward can be represented as an increasing function in both the volume
and the quality of the published papers.
In general, economic costs are related to the disutility of work. If there is clearly a cost
from writing papers, it may be assumed that the cost of reading papers is much lower. To
keep the model as simple as possible, in the following we abstract from the cost of reading
papers and emphasize the cost of writing. More precisely, we follow Faria (2007) and utilize
a quadratic cost function to account for a marginal increasing eﬀort in drafting papers.8
7 Furthermore, the most widespread research strategy seems to be that where scholars spend a lot of time
on a few papers, and less time on the others. Such a behavior makes sense only if ν =1 . Indeed, if ν>1
the scholar would spend all his time reading one single paper, and if ν<1 he would split his time equally
between all papers. But if ν =1 , since λ<1, then λ<ν .
8 It should be emphasized that introducing a cost of reading would only reinforce our basic result, according
to which in this environment scholars do not read enough (if a reading cost is included, they would read even
less).
9Given these assumptions, the researcher’s net payoﬀ from writing q papers of quality Q
can be written as the diﬀerence between the reward, proportional to the quality adjusted
volume of published papers, and total cost (quadratic in q):
U(q,Q,w)=wqQ− cq2. (5)
where w is an exogenously given wage coeﬃcient and c is a positive parameter.
3S o l v i n g t h e m o d e l
3.1 The researcher’s optimal choice
The researcher aims to maximize his net payoﬀ. He decides on the time spent on writing
q (and thus on reading new papers, i.e. 1 − q), taking as given the average quality of the
outside papers, QM and the overall number of papers published by the other scholars, qM.













We substitute the constraint into the objective, to get:
U(q,Q(q),w)=wqK (1 − q)
ν (qM)
λ−ν (QM)θ − cq2. (7)
The ﬁrst order condition dU()/dq =0can be written:
wK (qM)
λ−ν (QM)θ (1 − q)
ν−1 [1 − q(1 + ν)] = 2cq. (8)
Note that if a solution exits, it must fulﬁll the condition q<(1 + ν)−1.
103.2 The symmetric equilibrium
We analyze now the properties of the research environment of the researchers at the Nash
symmetric equilibrium. In equilibrium; identical researchers all adopt the same strategy.
Hence qM = nq and Q = ¯ QM, there is a single quality, identical for all papers.
So, if there is an equilibrium solution (ˆ q, ˆ Q), it must verify the system of two equations:
Q = K (1 − q)
ν (nq)
λ−ν (Q)θ ⇔ Q =
h
K (nq)





2cq = wK (nq)
λ−ν Qθ (1 − q)
ν−1 [1 − q(1 + ν)]. (10)
While such a non linear system cannot provide explicit solutions, the equilibrium number of
papers may be expressed as an implicit function of parameters. Let us write equation (10)
and let us replace Q by its expression (9), to get:
2cq = wK (nq)
λ−ν Qθ (1 − q)
ν−1 [1 − q(1 + ν)].




λ−ν (1 − q)
ν
i θ
1−θ (1 − q)





1−θ =[ 1− q(1 + ν)](q)
−
(ν−λ+1−θ)
1−θ (1 − q)
ν−(1−θ)
1−θ (11)
















Then equation (11) can be written in an equivalent but more compact form as:
a =[ 1− q(1 + ν)](q)
−
(ν−λ+1−θ)
1−θ (1 − q)
ν−(1−θ)
1−θ (13)
11Since a>0 and f(q)=[ 1− q(1 + ν)](q)
−
(ν−λ+1−θ)
1−θ (1 − q)
ν−(1−θ)
1−θ is a monotonic decreasing
function for q ∈]0,(1+ν)−1], with lim
q→0
f(q)=∞ and f((1+ν)−1)=0 , then there is a single
ˆ q that veriﬁes equation (13). From (9) we obtain the equilibrium quality, ˆ Q = Q(ˆ q).
3.3 Welfare implications
It is interesting to study whether the decentralized equilibrium is socially optimal. We study
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We want to determine the sign of this derivative for the decentralized equilibrium number






. To do so, we substitute in Eq. (17) a








(ν − λ)(1− q)+qνθ
[1 − q(1 + ν)](1 − θ)
< 0. (18)
12The decentralized equilibrium production of papers is not eﬃcient: if researchers were con-
strained to publish less papers, their utility would increase, and so would do the quality of
their work.
4 Research policy
The impact of various research policy reforms may be analyzed by studying the impact of
small variations in the parameter values on the equilibrium quantity and quality of published
research. An increase in n describes the creation of new research jobs, positive variations in w
correspond to a stronger relationship between the ﬁnancial reward and the quality-adjusted
number of papers and an increase in K is representative of an improvement of the general
research environment . (To keep the notation simple, in this section we drop the hat for
equilibrium values of q and Q.)
Before carrying out these analyses, we need two additional calculations. Firstly, let us
determine the elasticity of q with respect to a, denoted by η
q
a. For so doing, we write the
logarithm of Equation (13), then diﬀerentiate it:
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[1 − q(1 + ν)](1 − q)
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ν +( 1− q)[(ν − λ)+( 1− θ)]
(1 − θ)(1− q)
¾−1
(21)


























where q = q(w,K,n) stands for the decentralized equilibrium value. This equation will allow
us to analyze the impact of parameter change on quality.
We turn now our attention to analyzing the impact of single dimension policies on the
quality and quantity of research.
4.1 More powerful incentives for existing researchers (dw > 0)
The government may decide to stimulate researchers by increasing the wage coeﬃcient w.





a. Equation (12) implies that ηa







a > 0. (23)
As expected, more powerful incentives for publication lead to an increase in the time spend
on writing papers and to a bigger volume of publications.
In order to calculate the elasticity of Q with respect to w,d e n o t e db yη
Q
w, we consider n















This elasticity is negative, η
Q
w < 0: a stronger correlation between income and the quality-
adjusted number of papers is detrimental to the quality of research.9 If the researcher
dedicates more time to writing papers, he willr e a dl e s s ,a n dh i sa b i l i t yt op r o v i d eh i g h
9 It can also be shown that an increase in w leads to an increase in the researcher’s equilibrium reward
R = wqQ.
14quality papers would be aﬀected. Furthermore, in equilibrium the overall research quality
slides down, which contributes to further erosion of individual quality research.
4.2 More researchers














a < 0. (25)
The increase in the number of researchers brings about a decline in the number of papers
written by each researcher. Yet, the total number of papers qM will increase when n goes




n. I tc a nb ee a s i l ys h o w n
that |η
q
n| < 1, thus η
qM
n > 0.
We consider now w and K constants, and derivate both members of Equation (22) with










+( ν − λ)
¸
ηq
n +( ν − λ)
¾
. (26)
It can be shown that η
Q
n < 0 (see Appendix): an increase in the number of researchers pushes
down research quality. The rationale behind this disappointing outcome in the context of
this model is straightforward: raising the number of researchers brings about the increase in
the volume of publications. Researchers would then spend less time on each paper and have
diﬃculties in internalizing the original ideas, hence overall quality goes down. Researchers
try to compensate this quality loss by increasing the reading time, but their eﬀorts cannot
fully oﬀset the negative eﬀect.
154.3 Better research environment
The government may tune the quality of the overall research environment by supporting
the development of research networks, data banks, infrastructures, and everything else that
favors communications between researchers. In our simple model, all these improvements in















a > 0. (27)
Starting again Equation (22) from it can also be shown that the elasticity of Q with respect





















As shown in the Appendix, η
Q
K > 0. As expected, a more research friendly environment has
a positive impact on research quality. A better research environment has a positive impact
on both quality and quantity of research. This result is consistent with the empirical analysis
by Fender et al. (2005), who show that the probability of publishing in a major journal is
signiﬁcantly related to the quality of the working environment of the researcher.
As an upshot of all these, the most eﬀective policy seems to be the improvement in the
global research environment (dK > 0): this reform leads to an improvement in both the
quantity and the quality of the papers. A stricter correlation between the scholar’s income
and the quality-adjusted number of published papers (dw > 0) enhances the quantity pro-
duced by each researcher, but harms research quality. Increasing the number of researchers
(dn > 0) pushes down both the number of papers written by each researcher (but not the
16total amount), and the average quality.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The production of academic research is an important topic with signiﬁcant policy implica-
tions, since better understanding of it can help policymakers, institutions, and anyone else
involved, to design better incentives, systems and facilities that will improve research pro-
ductivity. In Europe, governments reacted to the 2000 Lisbon Summit’s call for improving
the research performance of the region by implementing various reforms of their research
management systems. All these reforms, be them market-based or purely administrative,
have in common a stronger tie between research performance and resources made available
to research institutions. When it comes to business schools and social science universities,
deans became more and more sensitive to the issue of providing faculty with more powerful
incentives for boosting the quantity and quality of their research. As a consequence, a kind
of publication frenzy is taking over the peaceful world of European academia.
In this context, our paper emphasizes some risks that may come with this change and
calls for a careful design of publication-friendly research policies. The key analytical element
is a basic dilemma for any researcher: the more time he spends on writing, the less time he
can spend on reading. In turn, the quality of researchers’ output declines without keeping
informed about the latest advances in their ﬁeld. Given that an individual researcher is not
able to internalize the impact of his own publishing eﬀort on the quality of the research of
his fellows, there is a natural tendency for individual researchers to focus on quantitative
publication targets and neglect, to some extent, quality. It was argued that this organization
of research is not socially eﬃcient: if researchers were able to coordinate their actions, they
17would publish less papers, but of a better quality.
In a second step, this simple model allows us to analyze the consequences of various
research policies. When bonuses for publication go up, it is rational for the individual scholar
to write more papers; but this individually rational choice may bring about a dramatic
outcome: the proliferation of publications entails the congestion eﬀect that harms both the
individual and overall quality of research. Increasing the number of researchers also has
a negative impact on both individual quantity and quality. What appears to be the most
appropriate policy is the improvement of the general research environment: better access
to databases and networks, additional equipment... In light of this analysis, the type of
direct EU research support provided thought the successive Framework Programmes seems
to be eﬀective, because it grants a generous amount of resources to a limited number of
researchers.10
For sure, these conclusions are not fully independent of our assumptions and should
therefore be interpreted cautiously. Such a simple model cannot claim to provide an ex-
haustive description of the global European system of research management in business and
economics. Yet it makes an important point that deserves the policymakers’ attention: if
getting papers published becomes a goal in itself, one should not be surprised to see the
quality of these publications decline.
10 The details of the Seventh Framework Programme 2007-2013: Building the Europe of Knowledge,a r e
available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/i23022.htm.
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A.2 Proof of η
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K > 0
From Equation (28), we know that η
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which is always true.
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